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Approved For Release 2006/02/01 : CIA-RDP80B01495R000300100032-6

DCI/IC 73-0849/

DDI-4156-73

15 August 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH:

D/DCI/IC

SUBJECT:

Memo fr DD/I to Mr. Colby, dtd 13 July 73, Subj.: Comments on IC Staff Proposal for Handling Crisis Situations (attached)

I was pleased that Dr. Proctor generally supported the concept presented by the IC Staff proposal for improving the current and crisis intelligence support. We recognize that reasonable men can disagree on some of the many details of implementing this concept and we will work out those disagreements as we make an orderly development of the concept. I would like to discuss some of Dr. Proctor's comments.

- a. Para. 2: There are several reasons for not proposing permanent organizational underpinnings.
 - (1) Improved communications diminishes the need for having representatives of all intelligence elements under one roof.
 - (2) The demands for senior intelligence people with authority to make decisions exceed their availability. DIA is enlarging its National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) to support the Expanded National Military Command Center (ENMCC) and it is not likely that DIA will be able to provide senior people for a National Intelligence Center at CIA.

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- (3) We do not see both DCI and CIA representation in the Watch Officers' or Analysts' Net as a normal practice. Generally, these nets would function with representation of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and NMCC to produce information and analysis for the DCI (or his NIO) and the senior authority of the other organizations. Perhaps we have not been as clear in our presentation of this point as we could have been.
- b. Para. 3: We believe that some improvements should and could be made in the CIB-type support to intelligence consumers and believe it may be easier to build a new product than to revise old images and habits. I think we share Dr. Proctor's objective of an effective reporting vehicle.
- c. Para. 4: We have, in a subsequent version of the concept paper, changed the "National Security Special Review" to SNIE.
- d. Para. 5: We agree that the idea of national weeklies and monthlies goes beyond our immediate requirements and that is not within the scope of our effort at this time. We would like to implement the Watch Officers' and Analysts' Nets first and discuss some ideas on weeklies and monthlies later.

SIGNED

Daniel O. Graham Major General, USA

Attachment

cc: \DD/I
D/DCI/IC
ER

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13 July 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Colby

SUBJECT

: Comments on IC Staff Proposal for Handling Crisis Situations

- 1. Earlier this month some of us in the Agency were briefed on work the IC Staff has done on handling crisis situations. As I understand the IC Staff proposal, it is to establish two new community reporting series for support of WSAG in crisis situations and to improve communications among operations centers for this purpose. I think these two proposals are a sensible response to the NSCIC request, and, with a few modifications, would be prepared to proceed with them once community agreement is reached. In particular, I like the idea of having established machinery and an established SOP for moving into a crisis.
- 2. The most important modification required has to do with structure. The system proposed has no permanent organizational underpinnings. Thus it seems to us to make a National Intelligence Center under the DCI all the more necessary, rather than moot. I would make such a center, with CIA as the executive agent, the controller and administrator of both nets. This would get around the incongruity of having both DCI and CIA representation.
- 3. The "National Security Summary" appears to be the equivalent of the Community Situation Report which we have proposed for crisis conditions, and as such makes sense. I do not quite understand, however, how this is to be extended to the

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
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"non-crisis which deserves special attention". The community already has in the Central Intelligence Bulletin an effective vehicle for this kind of reporting, with provision for dissents and conflicting views. It seems more sensible to us to build the CIB--or perhaps the "National Intelligence Bulletin" -- into the revised structure.

- 4. As you pointed out to Dick Lehman, the "National Security Special Review" is in fact a SNIE and should be produced by the existing system or whatever new mechanism replaces it. There is no need for additional ad hoc machinery or for a new series. I strongly support, however, the concept of mandatory production of SNIE's at the onset of a crisis and regularly thereafter in accordance with WSAG's requirements.
- 5. The idea of new national weeklies and any monthlies seems to me to go well beyond our immediate requirements, and to have implications for the structure of the community which need to be considered with great caution. I suggest this part of the proposal be set aside until you have had an opportunity to come to grips with this larger problem.

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EDWARD W. PROCTOR Deputy Director for Intelligence



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